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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ILLEGAL INCOME AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL
TAX PROSECUTION
In a recent report to Attorney General Brownell the Justice De-
partment's tax division said that during 1954 the division had brought
to a close more than 4,150 civil and criminal cases, about 25% more
than in any previous year.' This stepped up activity, particularly in
criminal cases, has been evident for some time. There is an increasing
effort to convict not only the more notorious criminals, but also the
businessman who has been evading his taxes. The division is no longer
prosecuting only the "sure" cases, but is also bringing to trial many
of the cases where the certainty of conviction is considerably less than
those cases brought to trial in past years.2
The increased activity in criminal tax prosecution causes many
practitioners to query as to what defenses are available to the taxpayer,
and which of those available will in all probability prove to be the
most effective. This comment will concern itself with the availability
of the defense that unreported income was obtained illegally and thus
is not includible in gross income.
DECISIONS PRIOR TO 1946
During the days of prohibition the courts on a number of occasions
had to determine if illegal income was taxable, although these were
not the first decisions in the area. An aid in determining that this type
of income was taxable was a change that had been made in the defi-
nition of taxable income in 1916. The Income Tax Act of 1913 origi-
nally defined income as including "gains, profits and income . . .
from . . .the transactions of any lawful business carried on for gain
or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatever .... ,,3 In 1916 this was amended by omitting the one word
"lawful." 4 In United States v. Sullivan5 the Supreme Court noted
this change, and approved the Circuit Court's interpretation of the
meaning of the omission.'
". ***it is significant that the word 'lawful' has been omitted
from the corresponding sections of subsequent revenue acts,
..." (p. 811)
The Supreme Court could not discover any interpretation of the
Revenue Act which indicated an intention on the part of Congress to
exempt from taxes the gain obtained from the sale of liquor contrary
1 M¢ilwaukee Journal, December 28, 1954, p. 10, col. 1.
2 Murphy, Increased Tempo for Criminal Tax Prosecutions, 59:5 CASE AND
COMMENT 28.
338 STAT. 167 (1913).
439 STAT. 756 (1916).
5274 U.S. 259, 47 S.Ct. 607, 71 L.Ed. 1037 (1926).
6 United States v. Sullivan, 15 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1926).
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to law. Further, they could find no reason why a business piohibited
by law should not pay taxes when, if it were lawful, it would have to
pay them.
Prior to the Sullivan case 7 the Supreme Court had found in two
other cases" that gains obtained from engaging in business in violation
of the Volstead Act was taxable. A comment from one? was quoted
in many later cases in this area.
"Of course, Congress may tax what it forbids." (p. 480)
At the same time the Board of Tax Appeals held that income
obtained from race track bookmaking in violation of the law was also
includible in gross income.' The court said,
" ... the words, 'from any source whateve,-' are as broad
and comprehensive as it is possible for language to be. There
is no limitation that the gain, profits, and income must be legally
received." (p. 328)
During the period to 1946 the courts also found gain from illegal
prize fight pictures," bribes, 12 misapplied funds of a client by an
attorney, 3 lotteries,' 4 unlawful insurance policies,' 5 protection pay-
ments, 6 and ransom money17 taxable to the receiver.
The only indication that there might be some types of illegal income
that were not taxable had come in early dicta in the Second Circuit.',
This court then stated that proceeds of embezzlement, robbery, and
burglary were not taxable.' 9
Prior to any decisions squarely in point, the Treasury was asked
if the proceeds of an embezzlement constituted taxable income. 20 The
reply was in the affirmative.
7Sitpra note 5.
8 United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450, 65 L.Ed. 1043 (1920) ; United States
v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 67 L.Ed. 358 (1922).
9 United States v. Stafoff, ibid.10 McKenna v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 326 (1925).
"1 Rickard v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 316 (1929).
"2 United States v. Commerford, 64 F.2d 28 (2nd Cir. 1933) ; Chadick v. United
States, 77 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1935) cert. den.
33 United States v. Wampler, 5 F.Supp. 796 (1933).
14 Droge v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 829 (1937).
35 Patterson v. Anderson, 20 F.Supp. 799 (1937).
16 Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1942).
Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704 (1942).
18 Rau v. United States, 260 F. 131 (2nd Cir. 1919) ; Steinberg v. United States,
14 F.2d 564 (2nd Cir. 1926).
19 In the Rau case the court said, "... if the moneys were merely to be passed
on to the insurance company, to be paid as premium by the defendant, as
agent, and if he embezzled them, he committed a larceny, and the money so
received would not be subject to taxation under the income tax law." (p.136)
In the Steinberg case the court stated, "It is true that a distinction may be
drawn between the profits of an embezzlement, a robbery, or a burglary ....
and those of sales of liquor, or plumes from birds of paradise, both of which
are at present under rather similar bans; but there remains a long list of un-
lawful and profitable occupations in which the proprietor has the legal title to
his illegal gains, which the thief has not." (p. 566)
20 C.B. XV-1, G.C.M. 16572, p. 82 (1936).
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"Furthermore, the" definitions of taxable income and all
analogies indicate that such proceeds were not excepted by Con-
gress from those gains which do not constitute taxable income."
(p. 83)
"There is nothing in the definition [of gross income as set
out by the Internal Revenue Code of 1916] to suggest that Con-
gress intended to draw a distinction between gains enjoyed by
the taxpayer to which he had legal title and those possessed
by him and inuring to his benefit but to which he does not have
legal title." (p. 82)
The first time that the question was directly in issue arose in 1938.1
The Second Circuit was faced with a fact situation in which one
O'Neil, as president and general manager of a corporation, mingled
bonds representing profits on the corporation's contracts with his own
bonds. He had cashed the coupons therefrom and deposited them in
his own account. When a Senate Committee began an investigation,
he left for France, delivering the bonds to his son with instructions to
deliver them to the corporation on his order, or at his death. He never
had reported the bonds as income in his returns. The Circuit Court
upheld the lower court's determination that the funds were taxable.
"They were of course the property of the Prairie company
in the sense that it could have reclaimed them: they were not
therefore like the earnings of an illicit liquor seller, which be-
longs to him however acquired.2 2 . . . But there are several cases
in which persons have been taxed upon property which could be
recovered from them." (p. 95)
In 1932 the Supreme Court had held that when a taxpayer has a
claim of right to money he has received, although he may have to repay
the money later, on receipt of it he is in receipt of taxable income.23
The decision was in a case where the money had been obtained legally,
but nonetheless the Second Circuit appropriated it to the field of illegal
income.
21 National City Bank of New York v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 93 (2nd Cir. 1938).
22 The courts do not explain what they mean when they make statements that the
person in receipt of certain types of illegal income have complete title to them.
Actually, what the courts must mean is that, in the absence of a statute, a party
to an illegal contract cannot invoke the aid of the courts in order to recover
any money paid in connection with the illegal contract. In the McKenna case,
supra note 10, the court did state this. "It is an elementary principle of law
that courts refuse to assist either party to an illegal contract-either to enforce
or abrogate it." In regard to the statutes providing that the courts may enforce
restitution it states, "Until the loser moves thereunder the parties are just
where they would be if no such statute existed. Without that statute no en-
forceable status of debtor and creditor would exist. The statute, then, does
not provide for the enforcement of a preexisting status, but provides a new
right in the loser .... If then, the loser does not pursue his remedy under the
law, there is no obligation to return property won by wager and unless and
until the loser does so act the property is unqualifiedly that of the winner; . .
(pp. 328 and 329).
23 North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
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"If he holds with a claim of right, he should be taxable as
owner, regardless of any infirmity of his title." (p. 96)
Some years later the Eighth Circuit was faced with the same
question as to whether or not the proceeds of an embezzlement was
includible in taxable income.24 One Kurrle, admitting he had embez-
zled funds from his employer, attempted to defeat the imposition of
a tax on the grounds that he had no title to the money thus acquired.
The lower court's decision that the money was taxable was affirmed
by the Circuit Court. In the opinion the court cites the National City
Bank case2 5 with approval, and points out that in many cases where
illegally acquired funds were held to be taxable income, the funds
could have been recovered by the rightful owners. The Burnet case"
is again cited and used as authority for the proposition that if a person
has a claim of right to the money he is in receipt of taxable income,
even though he may later have to repay it.
In the same year another embezzlement case came up in another
circuit.21 In this case the court held to the contrary.
"[He] got no title, void or voidable, to what he took. He
was in possession as he was before, but with a changed purpose.
He still had no right or color of right." (p. 573)
The court equates an embezzler with a debtor, and as a debtor is
not held to be in receipt of taxable income it follows, according to the
court, that neither should an embezzler. 28 The court does not explain
what it means when it states that the embezzler received no title, void
or voidable, and in making an analogy to the creditor-debtor relation
overlooks the possibility of adverse possession. If the property em-
bezzled by Spruance, the embezzler in this case, were sold by him
to an innocent purchaser for value, and that third person held the
property openly and adversely for the statutory period, the employer
could not recover it. If Spruance received no title whatsoever, this
would hardly be true.2
In this case Spruance was insolvent. A supporting reason for
holding that there was no income to be taxed was the inability of the
taxpayer to pay back the money to his employer.
"Moreover, the direct result of such a doctrine would be
that the United States would assert a preferential claim for
part of the dishonest gain, to the direct loss and detriment of
those to whom it ought to be restored." (p. 574)
24 Kurrle v. Helvering, 126 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1942).
25 Supra note 21.26Supra note 23.
27 McKnight v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1942).
28 Ibid. at p. 573.
29 Chapin v. Freeland, 142 Mass. 383, 8 N.E. 128 (1886) ; Shelby v. Shaner, 28
Okla. 605, 115 P. 785, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 621 (1911) ; Title by Adverse Posses-




Faced with two opposing views in the lower courts, the Supreme
Court passed on the issue in Commissioner v. Wilcox.0 Wilcox had
embezzled funds from his employer and then lost the money gam-
bling. He had been convicted of embezzlement by the state of Nevada
prior to the income tax evasion case coming before the Supreme Court.
In the opinion of the court "no single, conclusive criterion" had up
to that time been found which determined in all situations what was
a sufficient gain to support the imposition of an income tax. All rele-
vant facts and circumstances were, in the opinion of the court, to be
taken into consideration.S1 A standard for what was taxable income
was enunciated.
"For present purposes, however, it is enough to note that
a taxable gain is conditioned upon (1) the presence of a claim
of right to the alleged gain and (2) the absence of a definite,
unconditional obligation to repay or return that which would
otherwise constitute gain. Without some bona fide legal or
equitable claim, even though it be contingent or contested in
nature, the taxpayer cannot be said to have received any gain
or profit with the reach of Section 2 2 (a). ' '3 2 (p. 408)
Citing the McKnight case, 33 the analogy to a debtor is again used.
It was pointed out that under Nevada law the crime of embezzlement
was complete whenever an appropriation was made, and the employer
was entitled to replevy the money as soon as it was appropriated.
The inability of the taxpayer to repay the funds was also used to
support the decision. The grounds for this being the same as the
Fifth Circuit's: by asserting a lien, the government would have a right
superior to the employer for the money, and the employer is the one
who ought to be the first to recover.
The standard set down by the Supreme Court, however, left a
great deal to be desired. They first stated that all relevant facts and
circumstances had to be taken into consideration. This is so general
as to be meaningless. Then, instead of setting down a clear-cut defi-
nition of when illegal income was taxable, they gave a very loose
criterion of what was necessary to have taxable gain generally. The
court used the term "unconditional obligation to repay," but did not
state in any detail what it meant by that term. If it meant that the
complete absence of title would make acquired funds nontaxable, only
the gain of an embezzler or thief would be tax exempt. Persons having
voidable title to property, such as an extortioner or swindler, would
30327 U.S. 404, 66 S.Ct. 546, 90 L.Ed. 752 (1946).
31 Ibid. at p. 407.
321954 INTERNAL REVENUE CoDE, §61 (a).
33 Supra note 27.
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be required to pay a tax on their illegal income. On the other hand,
if it meant that any obligation to repay voided the supposition of a
taxable gain, then also those with voidable title to funds would be tax
exempt. Also, they stated that the first requirement to be met in
order to have takable gain was that there be a claim of right. If this
is taken in a strict sense of the term, any illegal income would be tax
exempt, yet the court did not indicate that it meant that it was over-
ruling all the prior cases where the taxpayer had voidable title and
was held to be in receipt of taxable income. By leaving the matter
in a vacuum, the Supreme Court left the lower courts to fend for
themselves, so to speak.3 4
DECISIONS SUBSEQUENT TO WILCOX AND PRIOR TO RUTKIN
After the Wilcox decision the lower courts held black market
operations,3 5 graft,36 and gambling3 7 gains to be taxable income. The
apparent result was making the line between void and voidable title
the dividing line between nontaxable and taxable income. In the
Steinberg, Himmelfarb, Potson, Schuermann, and Reichert38 cases
the courts did not discuss Wilcox. In the Chapman case3 9 the de-
fendant was convicted of selling meat for overceiling prices, over his
contention that the meat and money belonged to the corporation. The
court said,
"However, even if it were shown that appellant collected
as agent for the corporation, it would not necessarily follow
that there would be no liability on his part for attempted evasion
of the taxes due on such collections . . . . Hence, we find the
Wilcox case no authority for holding appellant not liable for the
tax evasion here charged." (p. 1002)
In the Nitto case40 the court was called upon to decide whether
graft money obtained by union leaders through threats against the
employers of increases in the number of employees, increases in wages,
and strikes was taxable income. In holding that it was, the court stated,
"The Wilcox case does not stand for the proposition that all
funds 'fraudulently or illegally obtained' are nontaxable."
(p. 865)
While making the dividing line the line between void and voidable
34 Note, 62 YALE L. J. 667 (1953).35 Petit v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 1253 (1948) ; Steinberg v. United States, 162
F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. den.; United States v. Chapman, 168 F.2d 997(7th Cir. 1948) ; Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949).
36 Reichert v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1027 (1953) ; Nitto v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.
858 (1949).
3 United States v. Potson, 171 F.2d 495 (7th Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Schuer-
man, 174 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Showell v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 60 (1955).3 8 Supra notes 36 and 37.




title, the courts did something else. They found no cases of void
title. An analysis of the cases during the six year period shows that
the courts went out of their way to find that there was not an embez-
zlement in the case then before them. While acknowledging the exist-
ence of the Wilcox decision, they made no apparent effort to apply
it to any fact situation. In some of the cases there is even an indirect
criticism of the Wilcox case.
In United States v. Currier Lumber Company4' a corporate officer
had transferred checks received by the corporation for sales of lumber
to his own personal account. He made no entry of either the original
receipt or the transfer to himself in the books of the corporation. The
District Court overruled his contention that he did not act under a
claim of right, and thus came within the Wilcox case, by holding that
as he had acted as a corporate officer he had transferred not only
possession and custody of the checks, but also legal title. The court
also relied on the fact that under Massachusetts law he was not an
embezzler because they could find no intent to steal or embezzle at
the time he took the checks, a requisite of the state statute. After
finding that the money was taxable, the court stated that it would
have been appropriate to rule that Currier both had a claim of right
to the gain, and was under no obligation to repay, thus having taxable
income under the Wilcox test,
"[But] with due deference to the Supreme Court, it seems
better to point out ... that the second prerequisite required in
the Wilcox case is not a universal sina qua non in determining
whether unlawful acquisition is a taxable gain." (p. 221)
A case in which the court definitely stated that they were drawing
the dividing line at voidable title was Akers v. Scofield.42 Akers ob-
tained substantial amounts of money from a Mrs. Roberts by repre-
senting to her that he could get maps showing where there was buried
gold on her ranch. The maps he produced he had drawn himself, and
the gold uncovered was brass bars that he had buried. In affirming
the holding that the funds so obtained were taxable income, the court
said:
"The distinction between theft and embezzlement on the one
hand and swindling on the other is that in the former case title
to the property acquired never passes, while in the latter case
title does pass." (p. 720)
This definition was obtained from the Texas statutes. The court
also said that Akers was estopped from denying his title to avoid
taxation.
4170 F.Supp. 219 (1947), aff'd. 166 F2d 346 (1st Cir. 1948).




This is the way matters stood in 1952 when the Supreme Court
had an opportunity to clarify the matter, but did not. In Rutkin v.
United States3 the court had before it a case in which the petitioner
had obtained $250,000 by threats against the life and family of an-
other. A new test for determining taxable income was announced by
the majority of the court.
"An unlawful gain, as well as a lawful one, constitutes tax-
able income when its recipient has such control over it that, as
a practical matter, he derives readily recognizable economic
value from it." (p. 137)
The Wilcox case was limited to its facts. Taking the standard on
its face, it appears that all wrongful appropriations are taxable, in-
cluding embezzlements and thefts, since at least temporary control is
obtained by the criminal. But, as the majority refused to overrule
Wilcox, the court opened the way for more confusion. It distinguished
between an embezzler and an extortioner, and stated that an extor-
tioner, unlike an embezzler, obtains funds "from a victim with his
consent." There was no explanation of the significance of the consent
of the victim. Yet its only legal consequence is to pass voidable title
to the criminal." Thus, Rutkin did not decide the issue of whether
control or voidable title was to be the measure of taxability.45
POST RUTKIN DECISIONS
The lower courts, having no more to go on than prior to Rutkin,
continued to make the distinction between void and voidable title,
holding that in the voidable title area there was taxable gain. The
seeming policy of not finding an embezzlement, with its inevitable
inconsistencies, also continued.
One of the first cases to arise after Rutkin was Rollinger v. United
States." Rollinger was hired as an agent by a Mrs. Mieras to purchase
diamonds for her. Instead he purchased zircons, sold them to her as
diamonds, and pocketed the excess, which he never reported as income.
On other occasions he did buy diamonds, but sold them to her for
more than he had paid. He also received a large sum when he told
her that the diamonds had been stolen, there was a police investigation
being conducted, and he needed money for pay-offs. None of this
was ever reported as income either. The court refused to agree with
him that he was an embezzler and held that he was either an extor-
tioner or an agent who made a profit on his agency. The court stated
43 343 U.S. 130, 72 S.Ct. 571, 96 L.Ed. 833 (1952).
44BROWNv, LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, §70 (1936); 2 BURDICK, THE LAW OF
CRIME, §§535, 835 (1946) ; 3 WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS, §§625(a), 635 (1948).
45 62 YALE L. 3. 667, supra note 34.
V 208 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1953).
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that the difference being that an embezzler appropriates funds he
has been intrusted with, whereas a swindler acquires property in the
first instance by means of false pretenses. While the law is correct, it
appears that in some instances Mrs. Mieras may have given the money
to Rollinger in order that he might buy the diamonds. If such was
the case, by the definition of the court, he was an embezzler. The
court only vaguely mentions the matter in the facts, and passes over
any mention of it in the opinion.
Another case that came up for decision shortly after Rittkin was
Kann v. Commissioner.4 7 The Kann brothers, who owned or controlled
90% of the stock of two corporations, caused payments to be made
to them by deliberate false and fictitious entries in the corporations'
books. In distinguishing Wilcox the court took cognizance of a number
of facts. They stated that there was no external evidence of an em-
bezzlement, as neither had ever been indicted or convicted, nor had any
corporate officer ever urged a prosecution. It appeared that the
corporation forgave the "unauthorized withdrawal. '48  And in this
case the brothers were well set financially and could make restitution,
unlike the Wilcox case. 49 The court also concluded that this could
not be an embezzlement because in reality it was merely a taking of
their own money. The fact that the state law made diverting corporate
money to their own pockets without the declaration of a dividend an
embezzlement, was held not to control in a tax case.
The court did not stop at a distinction from Wilcox, but also inti-
mated that the Supreme Court made an error in that case.
"Although the North American Oil case did not purport
to hold that there must be a claim of right before there can be
taxable income, the Wilcox case, citing North American Oil, did
so state." (p. 249)
Within the last year the Eighth and Fourth Circuits have had to
pass upon the question,5" and they also found ways to distinguish the
Wilcox case.
The court could find little similarity between the case of a book-
keeper who lost his employer's money gambling and that of the de-
fendant in the Briggs case5 ' who realized a secret profit on the sale
of his employer's land. Clark was authorized by his employer to pro-
47 210 F.2d 247 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. den.
48 This is the phrase the Circuit Court used to characterize the transaction in this
case.
49 "We agree with respondent [Commissioner] that if Wilcox is to be limited to
its facts this aspect of the case assumes considerable stature." Kann v. Com-
missioner, supra note 47 at p. 251.
50 Briggs v. United States, 214 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1954), cert den.; Marienfeld v.
United States, 214 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. den.
51 Briggs v. United States, supra note 50.
(Vol. 38
COMMENTS
cure bids on surplus land which the company desired to sell. He and
Briggs agreed that Briggs was to secure purchasers for prices in excess
of those that Clark would report to the company, with the excess
being divided. The firm discovered the arrangements when Clark
and Briggs were indicted for tax evasion, at which time they repaid
the company the money they had made. The court decided the case
as being controlled by Rutkin.
"We need not go into the question as to whether they were
guilty of embezzlement under the North Carolina statutes; for
we think it perfectly clear that through the fraudulent tran-
sactions in which they engaged they received moneys over which
they had complete control, which they treated as part of their
estates, which resulted in economic value to them and for which
they probably never would have been required to account, had
it not been for the discovery of the fraud .... " (p. 700)
The Eighth Circuit5 2 admits that they could find only a frail dis-
tinction in their case. Marienfeld had a contract with Stokely-Van
Camp Company to bone meat which Stokely delivered to him. He was
authorized to sell the by-products in Stokely's name, and periodically
make a report of the sales and return the proceeds therefrom. Marien-
feld sold some of the by-products in his own name, rendered false
reports, and pocketed the excess. The law of Missouri termed this
an embezzlement.
"But the present question is not whether appellant was guilty
of embezzlement under the law of Missouri, but whether the
funds he received were his income under the Act of Congress
defining taxable income.. State law will not be decisive in that
determination." (p. 636)
The court admitted difficulty in reconciling the Wilcox case with
the later opinion in the Rutkin case, but made an attempt at dis-
tinguishing Marienfeld's situation from Wilcox's anyway. The best
that could be done was to find that Wilcox was under an immediate
and instantaneous obligation to pay his employer the money collected
for him, whereas Marienfeld had no obligation to pay the money col-
lected to Stokely until there had been an accounting rendered. On the
second requisite to taxable gain announced in Wilcox, the court had
more difficulty.
"But we see no possible distinction between this case and
and the Wilcox case with reference to the bona fide legal
or equitable claim to the money. Appellant, like Wilcox, had
no bona fide claim. And the obligation of appellant to repay
differed from that of Wilcox only in point of time." (p. 637)
The court finally comes to the conclusion that the Rutkin test is
52 Marienfeld v. United States, supra note 50.
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the more appropriate one in this situation, and under it Marienfeld
had taxable income. The concurring opinion flatly states that control,
economic gain, value and enjoyment ought to be the tests, and fails to
see that the distinction between Rutkin and Wilcox is the matter of
void and voidable title.
PRACTICAL RESULTS OF THE DECISIONS
As a practical matter it can be stated that all illegal income is tax-
able, and that any defense on that ground is doomed to failure, unless
the situation is exactly identical with that in the Wilcox case. 53 Even
then it appears to be, in the opinion of some writers, 54 a good possi-
bility that the Supreme Court will reverse itself to conform to what
is now "existing law."
To attempt to plead that the crime was embezzlement under the
state law appears to be futile. In the Kann,55 Briggs,56 and Marien-
feld5'7 cases the courts refused to apply local law, saying that it was
not determinative in tax cases. And this in view of the fact that em-
bezzlement is purely a statutory offense, not known at common law.5 8
To plead that the transaction was not embezzlement under local
law, but should be ruled an embezzlement for the tax case, is equally
futile. Akers v. Scofield59 and Wilcox v. Commissioner60 applied local
law either to find no embezzlement or to find there was an embezzle-
ment. Hence, it appears the courts will use the statutes, or not use
them depending on the result they desire to obtain.
If intent is an essential under the state law, the Currier case6'
indicates that the court may find no intent, even though it would
appear that there could be no other intent than to steal or embezzle.
The Akers case 62 also indicates that the taxpayer may be estopped
from denying his title in order to avoid taxation.
Rollinger,6 3 Briggs,G4 and Marienfeld65 illustrate that the facts are
not necessarily in the taxpayer's favor regardless of how clear they
may seem to be. In Rollinger and Briggs the courts overlook relevant
53 The identity would have to be at least as complete as the taxpayer being in-
solvent as Kann v. Commissioner, supra note 49 states this, and might very
well have to have the taxpayer at least under indictment for embezzlement.
The Kann case also indicates-this in the discussion of the facts.
5 62 YALE L. J. 667, supra note 34; 96 L.Ed. 845 annotation to Rutkin case:
SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL TAXATION, CCH §1139, p. 57.
55 Supra note 47.
56 Supra note 50.
57 Supra note 50.5829 C.J.S., Embezzlement, §2, p. 671.
59 Supra note 42.
60 Supra note 30.
I'' Supra note 41.
62 Supra note 42.
63 Supra note 46.
64.Supra note 50.
65 Supra note 50.
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facts to come to their conclusion, and in. Marienfeld they admit the
fragile nature of their distinction, but make it nonetheless.
The end conclusion can only be that in the field of taxation the
old maxim that crime does not pay is still much alive and true.
DONALD D. EcKHA=r
